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Strategy is everything

We just need to think rigorously about it

Strategy has a bad reputation. How many senior executives do you know who use “strategic” as a pejorative? I get it.

Everything is a strategy these days. Corporate strategies, business unit strategies, technology strategies, procurement strategies, purchasing strategies. Forget about the consumer price index, we live in an era of strategy inflation.

We have strategies for everything, but can barely define the word. What makes a strategy a strategy: breadth, height, impact or something else? Is the distinction between strategy and tactics qualitative or quantitative? How can we employ a concept we can’t define?

And, oh, the strategists. Anyone who has read the first chapter of Competitive Strategy and has walked past a copy of The Art of War in an airport bookstore claims the moniker of strategist — despite innocence of the ideas of Luttwak, Boyd, Liddell Hart, Jomini and Mackinder.

But Sir Lawrence Freedman implies strategy is everything, or at least underpins everything. In his history of the idea of strategy, Freedman refuses to limit himself to statesmen and great captains. He locates the seeds of strategic thinking in the Torah and Greek epics and extends it all the way forward to nineteenth- and twentieth-century revolutionaries and political activists. Strategy involves humans exercising agency to achieve consequential objectives in the face of resistance and constraints. Maybe the use of strategy as an idea is okay, if we think rigorously about?

I worry my dear colleague Whitney Zimmerman is too generous with Michael Porter. He counters that I conflate Porter with the Porterites. We enjoy debating Luttwak.

I also greatly enjoyed my discussion with Whitney about his new book, Strategy and Value, co-authored with our McKinsey colleagues Tim Koller and Andy West.

  1. What makes a strategy a strategy? Is it a few bold, coherent choices about allocating resources, as Whitney argues, or a falsifiable wager on how the world works, as I maintain?

  2. Where does strategy end and doctrine begin? Is Jamie Dimon’s fortress balance sheet a strategy, or a governing conviction within which JPMorgan makes strategic choices?

  3. Can you have a technology strategy independent of a business strategy? And what good is a technology strategy that treats applications, infrastructure, cybersecurity and data as separate kingdoms? [1]

  4. Why are organizations so reluctant to argue? If there is zero tradeoff between vigorous debate and warm collaboration, why do so many executives behave as though disagreement is a character defect?

  5. Will AI make us better strategists or merely more confident idiots? If machines do the analytical work, where will the next generation of executives acquire the judgment to recognize when the machines are wrong?

  6. Are we confusing projection with momentum? How can a company deliver splendid financial results while quietly consuming its future? As Lampedusa observed in The Leopard, everything must change for things to remain the same.

Strategy Linked to Value


In this section:

  • Strategy and Value, out November 17, distills more than 50 years of McKinsey thinking on strategy and valuation.

  • The premise is the connection between strategy and value, not either one alone.

  • The book pairs the concepts that drive decisions with practices that hold across approaches to strategy.


James Kaplan: Hi there. This is James Kaplan with another Prosaic Times video podcast. I’m here with my colleague Whitney Zimmerman. Whitney, do you wanna introduce yourself?

Whitney Zimmerman: Sure, James. It’s a pleasure to be on Prosaic Times. I’m a big fan, regular listener.

So I have the unfortunately fancy title of Distinguished Expert in Strategy, which means that I get to spend all of my time thinking and working with others on the future of strategy, and also, of course, talking with clients about it. I have been with a firm since twenty eighteen. Before that I spent about eight years in industry, in BMW and in semiconductor manufacturing.

I’m an engineer by training, but my big passion is two questions. What makes leaders good at strategy, good at leading the work of strategy?

And what makes institutions institutionally good at strategy as well? So, excited to be here.

James: Okay, and I will note you’re one of the relatively few people I know who’s read more books about strategy than I have, which I respect. And now—

Whitney: I like the competition.

James: Yes, now we’ll have a strategy book club. You’ve written a book, so tell us a little bit about that.

Whitney: Yeah, so we are coming out on November 17th with Strategy and Value: The Four Foundations That Drive Long-Term Performance. It is a distillation, a grounding of over 50 years of McKinsey thinking on both strategy and valuation. And importantly, it’s that intersection.

It is the connection between strategy and value. And it talks about the fundamental things that you need to understand in order to ensure that strategy creates value, both from concepts that drive the decisions you make and also some of the practices that apply across all kinds of approaches to strategy.

Strategy as Choices, Not Theory


In this section:

  • Strategy is a few big, coherent choices that guide resource allocation; it is not an obligation or a plan for tomorrow.

  • A thesis, like the fortress balance sheet, is the theory behind the choices; keeping the two apart sets a higher bar for what counts as strategy.

  • Strategic choices concern where to play, how to play and future customer value; tactical choices are the reversible, day-to-day ones.


James: Okay. So let me ask a little bit of an almost conceptual question. Strategy is one of those words, I don’t know, governance, that can mean almost anything to anyone. What is strategy to you, and how is it different from management, and how is it different from tactics?

Whitney: This question of what is strategy, there’s a reason why it isn’t clear. It’s because there are legitimately many schools of thought on what strategy is.

And that’s both important, because there are many important reasons and ways of thinking about strategy, but it’s also a challenge. And it’s why I always start every conversation I have with a new executive talking about what I think strategy means.

We like to think about strategy as choices. It’s a very classic way of thinking about it. A coherent set of, usually, few big choices, or bold choices, that are designed to work together with some kind of underlying logic in order to change a business by guiding capital allocation, resource allocation, et cetera.

I like to say that a strategy shouldn’t be an obligation. It’s not like you need a strategy in order to know what to do tomorrow.

Strategy is important as a tool for changing a business. You use these choices in order to guide resource allocation. You use it in order to communicate some sort of underlying logic.

I also like to differentiate it from theory or a thesis. There’s a great example of a theory or thesis, which is Jamie Dimon’s fortress balance sheet concept, which he’s talked about for 20 years in his shareholder letters. The idea is that he has a unique view of the future, which is that they work in a very volatile industry, and that stability matters.

And that in order to succeed, it is important to have a fortress balance sheet to be able to lead through volatility, to be there for your customers, and also to take advantage of uncertainty. That isn’t, in my view, their strategy. Their strategy is the choices they’re making in any given year to build new businesses, to acquire companies, to build new capabilities, to transform how they work.

Those choices are ultimately informed by the thesis or the theory. And holding those two separate is valuable because it allows you to hold a higher bar for what a strategy really is. It is getting to those clear choices.

It’s about saying no. It is about having that underlying theory. And so that’s how we think about strategy.


Strategy is important as a tool for changing a business. You use these choices in order to guide resource allocation. You use it in order to communicate some sort of underlying logic.


James: So what if someone were to ask you which choices are strategic choices versus which choices are tactical choices? How do you draw that distinction?

Whitney: On the tactical side, typically tactical choices are things that you’re doing day to day in order to advance your business, and they’re often reversible. They’re often doing things that are sensible in pursuit of goals.

For strategic choices, I like to think about a classic framework from McKinsey, from Kenichi Ohmae in the 1980s, called the Strategy Triangle, where he organized strategies into a triangle, saying there are competitor strategies, there are customer strategies, and there are corporate strategies. We are doing things in order to pursue customer opportunity, we are doing things in service of competing with competitors, and we are doing things to change or leverage how we work as a business. I map that to how we think about it in the book.

Strategic choices should be about either changing where you are playing, because you believe a market is becoming fundamentally more or less attractive; changing how you are playing, in pursuit of competitive advantage; and doing things that are in service of pursuing or creating future customer value. And those three things are deeply interlinked, which I think is easy to miss.

People think, I just need to pick where I play and then pick how I’m gonna win. And in reality, those two questions of where do I play and how do I win in service of creating value are deeply interlinked, both with each other and also with where future customer value is going.

Keeping a Market Leader Honest


In this section:

  • A market leader can look strong while its underlying momentum declines.

  • A shared reality about markets, advantage and value creation keeps strategic choices honest.

  • Staying unique is a lens on market leadership that gets too little attention in stable times.


James: Well, first up, let me ask two questions here. First, you talk about strategy in the context of change. Can a strategy be—maybe reactionary is the wrong word—but say you’re the market leader. Could you have a strategy around keeping things the same?

Whitney: One of the good ways of thinking about this is momentum. You always want to have an understanding, not just what you’re projecting, but what the true underlying momentum of the business is. And when you see it that way, you can say, yes, we’re a market leader today, yes, things have been going well, but if you look at the underlying momentum of the business, it might be declining, due to various headwinds, due to various short-term decisions you might be making, bad optimization of how you’re thinking about market share versus capability.

When you’re doing strategy, it’s important to have a sort of shared reality amongst your team about the fundamental attractiveness of your markets, about the nature of advantage, and about how and why you create value, and to look at that momentum to keep you honest about the strategic choices you might need to make in order to sustain your market leadership.

James: Yeah, I think there’s a famous novel called The Leopard where one of the characters says, everything will need to change if we want things to remain the same.

Whitney: Yes, and it’s all about perspective. It’s also one of those things where strategy is often talked about as being about uniqueness. It’s not always the case. But trying to understand how we continue to be unique, how we stay unique, is a lens on market leadership that is often one that doesn’t get enough focus, and is important, especially in times of stability.

Systems Thinking and Doctrine


In this section:

  • A strategy and the theory behind it work as a system only when people share common language and mental models.

  • McKinsey’s 7S framework, now evolved into Organize to Value, treats an organization as a system, though a team of systems thinkers does not guarantee a system that works.

  • Doctrine adds values and productive constraints; with ideas now abundant, constraint separates good strategy from a surplus of ideas.


James: So I was very taken by your point about the fact that where to play and how to win are so interconnected. And sometimes I worry that in many businesses people think in a very siloed way. We’ve got our manufacturing strategy over here, we have our customer strategy over there, we’ve got our technology strategy hidden in a corner and never—nobody’s allowed to—that’s not allowed to be connected to anything.

What you’re saying evokes systems thinking to me. And I wonder, the fascinating thing about systems is that it’s so nonlinear that four pieces together are worthless, but five pieces together are incredibly valuable. I was wondering if you could talk a little bit about the interplay of systems thinking and strategy.

Whitney: Yes. There are so many angles on systems thinking going through my head at the moment. So, some of the things that come to mind.

Number one, this is why I think it’s valuable to separate a strategy, the coherent choices you’re making in any given part of the organization, and the underlying theory or thesis. And this comes from the theory-based view of strategy from Zenger and Felin and others, and the idea that in order for a system, an organization, to effectively change, you benefit from having that sort of theory or thesis, a unique view of the future, your place and the advantages you can have in it, how you capture value, et cetera. Because it allows the broader system, the people around an organization, to have the same sort of underlying causal logic, the underlying theory that allows them to sense opportunities coherently and make choices.

And when you just focus on strategy, meaning the choices you’re making, oftentimes the broader system can’t always connect to those choices. Leaders across an organization may be able to connect their jobs to one or two of them, sometimes not.

And so for a system to work well, I think that’s where it’s important to have that sort of underlying corporate theory or thesis. That’s number one.

I think number two: systems work well when there’s common language, common mental models. There’s a lot of discussion today about clarity of ontologies. Our research finds that top teams that have a clear understanding of what strategy is and what quality strategy looks like outperform.

They’re more likely to reach the top of our economic profit power curve. [2] And so having a sort of shared standard, and we have a standard in the book, a standard for strategy, ensures that across an organization there’s a sort of strategic culture, a level of coherence about how we think, which is very, very important.

I think it’s also important not to become overfocused on one dimension. A classic McKinsey framework from the 1980s that’s a systems-thinking framework, the 7S, has now evolved into—

James: Yes, I would agree. I would very much agree. Seven S is a systems thinking framework.

Whitney: It’s fundamentally a systems orientation to how you view an organization. And that’s why the paper that introduced it, “Structure Is Not Organization,” started by talking about how you can’t just understand an organization by looking at its structure. And it equipped people with the ability to see the broader system and pull together, much like our book is trying to do, literature from across different fields into the essentials.

And that, of course, has now been evolved and modernized in our Organize to Value framework, which is very powerful. There is a benefit to people having a systems view, and as an electrical engineer I really value that. But it’s also worth recognizing that just because everyone in an organization is a systems thinker doesn’t necessarily mean that the system will work well at the end of the day, if that makes sense.

James: Fair. What you’re thinking is the difference between strategy and doctrine? And doctrine I sometimes mean to be, yeah, we do things this way. This is how we build a car, right?

Whitney: Yeah, so the way I think about doctrine personally is very consistent with the idea of what an organization’s corporate theory or value creation thesis is. I think, though, that doctrine, the way I think about it, can go a little further than that. It also can have values that matter to an organization, and it’s something that fundamentally is designed to focus, to constrain.

Productive constraints, to equip people with a way of understanding how and why they feel they can create value. And it’s central to people being able to be part of an organization and not just a good leader.

James: Yeah. If you think about military doctrine, say in the US military, NCOs have a lot of responsibility, which is different from other militaries. And you might say that’s part of the doctrine of how the US runs its armed forces. That’s applicable probably in a whole bunch of different strategic contexts, but the effectiveness of a relatively small unit, or the assumptions you can make about the effectiveness of a relatively small unit, creates, I presume, strategic options in deploying forces.


Just because we are awash with ideas, we have a surplus of ideas, doesn’t mean that translates to strategy, to good strategy. Constraint, productive tension, is an important way of getting to value.


Whitney: Yeah, and we are awash with strategic options today. No one is lacking for strategic ideas and options. And AI, of course, is only making that— there’s a lot of discussion about how AI can give you just the average option, but in reality, I think in practice, there are a lot of situations where you’re seeing the idea not come from the AI but from the edge of the organization, where a leader sees something, has an idea, or has always had one and now has AI as a little team to be able to bring it to life.

And so we are awash with ideas. But just because we are awash with ideas, we have a surplus of ideas, doesn’t mean that translates to strategy, to good strategy. Constraint, productive tension, is an important way of getting to value.

And doctrine, or corporate theory, or value creation thesis, et cetera, is an important way of ensuring that the ideas being identified by a small team, et cetera, are more likely than not going to be coherent and complementary to how the overall organization is working, the capabilities it’s building, its ability to change, its momentum, and where it’s moving. And so that’s why I think it’s important to have that. It’s also why, in our penultimate chapter, which has recently been published in McKinsey Quarterly as the undelegatable roles of the CEO, we don’t say that the CEO owns strategy.

Only the CEO can own strategy: I think that’s an unhelpful frame. I think many, many people across an organization can own this practice of getting to big, clear, coherent choices and saying what’s going to stop and what is not going to happen.

But ultimately, the second role, for us, is the view that only the CEO can change the company’s value creation thesis, which you might also frame as doctrine. It’s that thing that gives everyone a sense of who we are and where we’re going into the future.

Functional and Integrative Strategy


In this section:

  • Strategy as a tool of few big choices applies at any level, including a function or one person.

  • At every level strategy integrates the pieces beneath it, and capabilities move across the business.

  • Debate is how an organization integrates; each strategic initiative needs one owner, which themes cannot supply.


James: Is the idea of functional strategy a meaningful idea? We often talk about marketing strategy or manufacturing strategy or procurement strategy. Is that meaningful, or is that just wrapping planning in higher level terms, or what have you? What does a functional strategy mean to you?

Whitney: Yeah. So it’s important to, I think, expose my biases within this. So—

James: Please. That’s what we’re here for.

Whitney: So, as I’ve mentioned, I see strategy as a tool. It is a set of few big choices you are making in order to guide how resources are allocated in pursuit of some greater value. And it is used to change a business.

And when you take that as the definition, it is something that you can do anywhere in the organization, including for yourself personally. I am making a few big choices. I’m making clear about what I’m not gonna do.

I have some sort of underlying theory for what those choices are. And I’m comfortable with the extent to which those choices are either betting on certainty or trying to shape the landscape, either by adapting to uncertainty or by trying to create it.

And when you take that as a way of viewing strategy, then it makes complete sense to say, yes, of course we should think about functional strategy. We should think about using this tool of a few big choices, or coherent choices, that make clear how we should change our part of the business, coherent with and in support of a broader strategy and a broader thesis in the organization. Now, that isn’t the only way of thinking about it.

James: Right. You know, I’m not a—we’ve discussed that I’m not a Porter fan. I may throw you off the video conference set.

Whitney: Yeah, and I am a Porter fan. But I think that’s why it’s important to define terms in an organization, of what do we mean by strategy and what does it do for us. And there can be different views, and very legitimate ones, but what matters in an organization is clarity of what we mean, especially in an age of AI, where it’s important to ground ourselves and our AIs in that sort of epistemology, not just ontology.

James: Yeah. Sometimes I think of strategy at any given level as integrative, which is the way you bring together marketing plus sales plus operations plus technology plus procurement plus half a dozen other things. And at the enterprise level, it’s often strategy across business units plus functions.

In a business unit, it’s across functions. In a function, it’s across subdomains. Let’s take technology strategy.

We can break down an enterprise technology organization into a bunch of different parts: application development, infrastructure, cybersecurity, data, what have you. And a lot of what I see as interesting enterprise technology strategy is the integration of the strategies across the different components of the technology organization.

You see the same for marketing or operations or any other function. Does that resonate at all?

Whitney: Completely. And I think that it’s particularly important today. There’s a great school of thought called dynamic capabilities, from David Teece and others, where they talk about advantage coming from the ability to take capabilities in one part of an organization and bring them to another, in order to ensure that what you’re doing, and what you’re bringing from your business or building, is meeting the moment, wherever you are.

That, of course, is a fundamentally integrative task, of how you are thinking about moving things across a business, bridging capabilities from one context into the other. That’s my first thought.

The second is that one of the points we make in the book is that we don’t say there’s one approach to strategy, because there are many. We say there are some universally important practices, like having that shared reality, holding strategy to a high bar, but also debate. We say, listen, productively disagreeing or debating is how we bring our different perspectives from different parts of a business or our humanity into a problem.

And it is important to equip teams with the tools, the language, the permission to debate the right things for strategy, at the right times. And if you don’t do that, if you don’t focus on the quality of debate, the quality of productive disagreement, in an organization, it can be very, very difficult to be institutionally integrative, as opposed to there being someone that is the integrator.

And the third thing I would say about that is one of the failure modes I see in organizations is that they see a real need for a strategic choice, a strategic initiative that is cross-functional, but they don’t— Part of our standard for strategy is to say any given strategic choice should be codifiable as one or very few strategic initiatives, each of which should be owned by one person. And oftentimes strategy comes out as themes, which is a way out of getting to enough clarity about how we are going, as an organization, to ensure one person can own, for example, a cross-functional strategic choice.


We say, listen, productively disagreeing or debating is how we bring our different perspectives from different parts of a business or our humanity into a problem. And it is important to equip teams with the tools, the language, the permission to debate the right things for strategy, at the right times.


James: I don’t know how you execute on a theme.

Whitney: Indeed. And our research finds that mobilization of strategy matters a lot, and that companies exceptional at mobilization are also exceptional at getting strategy to a high standard with clear choices. [3] And so this idea of an integrative approach to strategy is also, I think, very intertwined with holding a high standard for how clear a choice is, in order to push the debate long enough to the trade-offs required for one person to own something that is truly integrative.

Debate and Productive Disagreement


In this section:

  • Corporations may have grown less comfortable with conflict, though no one has longitudinal data to say so.

  • Teams able to debate in service of the best answer show a marker of success, especially under uncertainty.

  • Organizations treat debate as something to make comfortable instead of a capability to build; tools like Amazon’s six-page memo prepare people for it.


James: Let me ask this question; it’s a bit of a cultural question. I sense, and I can’t prove this, that corporations are less comfortable with conflict than might have been the case twenty years ago. They conflate intellectual tension with personal conflict, making, in some cases, it harder to have the sort of debates you’re describing around strategy.

Do you agree with that hypothesis? And do you think that institutions that are willing to have the real debates, that the willingness to have real debates about tough choices, becomes an indicator of success or a marker of potential success?

Whitney: I don’t— I don’t have data longitudinally on whether organizations—

James: None of us do. I certainly don’t either.

Whitney: —have gotten worse over time. I do know it has always been an issue. I think it’s part of human nature to be consensus oriented. That’s why Peter Drucker used to talk about the importance of productive disagreement.

I would also hypothesize that it has gotten worse over time, organizations having consensus-oriented cultures that don’t lend themselves to productive disagreement, to debate. I also would agree, from my client work, that organizations where top teams or any teams have an ability to have productive debate in service of the best answer, where we’re trying to have sympathy for others’ perspectives to bring it to the best answer, I think is a very important marker of success. And it’s something particularly important in uncertainty.

There is lots of research on the cognitive biases and social dynamics that can hold teams back from grappling with their strategy. And you don’t have to necessarily be comfortable with debate and productive disagreement to understand it matters. There are lots of things that we do in organizations that we don’t want to do because we know it’s important.

And I don’t think enough organizations place that priority on debate. They look for it to be comfortable, as opposed to understanding it is important and a capability to have.


There are lots of things that we do in organizations that we don’t want to do because we know it’s important. And I don’t think enough organizations place that priority on debate. They look for it to be comfortable, as opposed to understanding it is important and a capability to have.


James: Well, if you believe a company or a corporation is, at least in part, an information processing entity, then the debate’s incredibly important, right? Because that’s part of processing information.

Whitney: Yeah, absolutely. And we also see that—this is where I’m a little bit out of my depth, potentially—but what I see is that there’s a lot of focus on ensuring that AI agents are debating each other, because we know it gets to better answers, at least when done well. And so I think we all know that this is important, but it doesn’t make it easy. The question is whether or not it’s considered to be valuable.

And I think that’s also why you have seen, over time, many, many organizations putting in place tools like Amazon’s six-page memo, which is fundamentally about preparing for a debate and equipping people to have a shared reality, including shared mental models and language, to be able to have a high-quality debate. And I think that then lends itself to the value of it.

AI and Shared Understanding


In this section:

  • AI can reinforce a user’s biases or, set up as adversarial agents, sharpen thinking.

  • Earlier computing revolutions degraded shared reality in some organizations; the same risk returns as analysis is automated.

  • Understanding how things work, like driving a manual transmission, is worth renewing through strategy work.


James: I wonder if the advent of AI will sharpen—will widen the disparity. Because I would suggest to you, if you’re using a large language model via a chat window, often the result is sycophantic and will reinforce your biases. In contrast, if you’re very thoughtful and careful, you can set up an agent to engage in adversarial review, or to give a range of perspectives, or to debate each other. And I wonder if it makes it both easier to reinforce your biases and also easier to challenge them, and you perform an acid test on your thinking.

Whitney: It’s a good question. One of the things I’m hyper tuned to with myself is trying to manage extrapolation bias, trying to avoid thinking, okay, how have things worked recently, and that means that they’re gonna work that way going forward. I think you and I are kindred spirits in caring about history as a way of debiasing.

One of the things that’s interesting from history is that there have been other massive computing revolutions, like, for example, the rollout of mainframe computers in the 1950s and 60s, and the rollout of personal spreadsheets and ERP databases and relational databases, et cetera. And what we have found in going back into our own archives and in doing research is that after these computing revolutions that have increased the ability to automate analysis, there has been, with some organizations, a degrading of the shared reality. [4] Meaning where people aren’t really—I don’t want to misuse this term—but are in the loop.

They don’t have that shared mental model, shared language. They don’t share a view—it doesn’t mean they have to agree about the outside—but it’s important to share the ability to talk about what’s going on outside the business. And—

James: I always worry about those science fiction novels where a group of people is in some generation ship and there’s some computer that controls the ship, and at the beginning they understand how to work the computer, and then five generations in they’ve lost any understanding and the computer has become God, right?

Whitney: Yeah, that relates to this idea.

James: They see it as a deity that issues pronouncements, right, rather than a tool.

Whitney: Yeah, and what I was going to say is that there are natural reasons why that shared reality might degrade, because of the volume of analysis. My colleagues have just done a good piece on the judgment bottleneck.

But it’s not universal. There are plenty of organizations that also stayed in the loop, in the sense of ensuring analyses were in service of a so-what, that they were grounded in what really creates value, and things being in pursuit of decisions. And your point just now about generations later, that is a very natural progression in any technology regime.

It happened in the medieval period as well, where painters would, generation to generation, learn from their masters by copying, and stop understanding why certain things mattered, and things got flattened out. And the Renaissance was in part about regaining an understanding of the fundamentals and breaking with them.

And the same thing happens in strategy, where you do strategy review year after year, and you’re doing these templates and you’re starting to forget why you’re doing it. And so what I also want to say is that I don’t think it is a foregone conclusion that it will happen, that it’ll increase the disparity, because it is a general-purpose technology.

One of the things that is powerful about AI is that it can make it easier to learn things. And what I have found, and this is also research from Frank Keil at Yale, who’s a cognitive scientist who looks at how people understand how things work, is that it is very, very important for people to understand how things work. It applies for children being able to take apart toys.

It applies also for organizations, in understanding how our organization works and whether we are exposed to the inner workings of it. And that, of course, relates—


It is very, very important for people to understand how things work. It applies for children being able to take apart toys. It applies also for organizations, in understanding how our organization works and whether we are exposed to the inner workings of it.


James: This is why I’m so opposed to automatic transmissions.

Whitney: Well, automatic transmissions are really cool, as an ex-automotive engineer.

James: No, no, no. But you understand, using a manual transmission, you intuitively understand the dynamics of the car, right? You can feel it.

Whitney: You understand how things work. Exactly. And so that’s why I also say strategy processes, strategy work should be in service of renewing and reinvesting in how we understand how things work: the why behind where to play, how to win, and how we make money.

And when there are incentives towards people understanding the why of their organization, it is more likely that tools like AI will also be used in service of sustaining that understanding of the why. And so that’s why I think it’s important, with this book as well, to reground people in some few fundamental concepts that are ultimately about the why, that sit beneath every way of doing strategy, and will unlock the kind of focus and priority that leads to better value creation with strategy.

Strategy Books Worth Reading


In this section:

  • Drucker’s The Practice of Management and The Effective Executive reground strategy in focusing on the right few things.

  • Todd Zenger’s Beyond Competitive Advantage makes the case for corporate theory, and his forthcoming Theory First, with Teppo Felin, extends it.

  • Three business memoirs show strategy in practice: Gerstner at IBM, Lafley and Martin on P&G, Cote at Honeywell.


James: Okay, in the service of time, we’re probably gonna have to cut it there. This has been fantastic. You’re gonna have to come back, and we’ll have probably—let’s dive deeper into the implications of AI on strategy. But before we go, three books other than your own on strategy that you would recommend, or that you find especially insightful. Either business strategy or geopolitical strategy.

Whitney: Yeah. So, number one, I think that a lot of things we need, we already know. And it’s valuable to reground yourself in the past.

I think a book like The Practice of Management from Drucker or The Effective Executive are really, really important to strategy, focusing on the right few things. Secondly, I’m a big fan of Todd Zenger’s Beyond Competitive Advantage, which talks about corporate theory. He also has a book coming out with Teppo Felin called Theory First, which is really relevant there.

And then I would say, I always like business memoirs that really get at strategy, how things happened. I’ll throw three in there. I think Lou Gerstner’s Who Says Elephants Can’t Dance, in terms of turning around IBM, is really powerful.

Playing to Win by Roger Martin and A. G. Lafley is fundamentally a story of a business, in addition to being a great guide to how you do strategy and how you understand things, that’s consistent with how we think in many ways. And then as well, David Cote’s Winning Now, Winning Later, about his time at Honeywell and trying to really maintain focus on the long term and ground people in a shared view of how to talk about strategy, I think is really powerful.

James: Fantastic.

Bonus, bonus two books. Thank you so much, Whitney.

Whitney: Pleasure. Thanks for having me.

Score Your Own Strategy

*{Six questions to take back to your own team, one for each I raised at the top. Score a point for each yes. Fewer than four, and you may have a plan with a better name.

  1. Choices. Can you name the few big choices that make up your strategy, including what you have decided to stop?

  2. Thesis. Can you state in two sentences the conviction behind those choices, and does your CEO own it?

  3. Integration. Do applications, infrastructure, cybersecurity and data answer to one technology strategy, and does that strategy answer to the business?

  4. Debate. When did an argument over a strategic choice last cost someone comfort?

  5. Judgment. If machines do the analysis, where will your next executives learn to tell when the machines are wrong?

  6. Momentum. Is your underlying momentum rising or falling, whatever your projections say, and who would tell you?

-- Ed.}

Footnotes

[1] The December 14, 2025 issue, The tyranny of the use case and the need for enterprise tech doctrine, takes up this question at length.

[2] Economic profit is operating profit after deducting the cost of capital. In McKinsey’s analysis of the 2,393 largest companies from 2010 to 2014, the top quintile captured nearly 90 percent of the economic profit created (Bradley, Hirt and Smit, “Strategy to beat the odds,” McKinsey Quarterly, February 2018). The research behind the claim is “How Strategy Champions win” (McKinsey Quarterly, July 2025), which finds that stragglers are nearly twice as likely as Strategy Champions to have little or no agreement on what makes strategy high quality.

[3] The same research, “How Strategy Champions win”, finds that the biggest gap between Strategy Champions and stragglers is in mobilization, the phase of translating strategic choices into organizational readiness.

[4] In his conversation with Yale cognitive scientist Frank Keil, Whitney points to Lou Gerstner’s IBM in 1993 as a firm that had mastered analysis but whose leaders no longer shared an actionable view of the world. He writes about the case in his LinkedIn article on sustaining shared reality.

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